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PRICE-LEVEL ACCOUNTING,
FULL DISCLOSURE, AND RULE 10b-5:
HALF A LOAF IS NOT ALWAYS
BETTER THAN NONE
HOWARD M. FRIEDMANt
On December 31, 1974, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) proposed a major revision of generally accepted
accounting principles. The Board, the body recognized as au-
thoritative in the creation of accounting standards,' issued an
exposure draft entitled Financial Reporting in Units of General Pur-
chasing Power.2 The document proposed that fiscal-year-end fi-
nancial statements include supplemental restatements reflecting
the current purchasing power of the dollar.3 Such reporting has
generally been referred to as "price-level" accounting.
Although price-level accounting has been heralded as a sub-
stantial technical refinement, providing financial reporting with
a constant unit of measurement, 4 the approach may more realis-
tically be seen as an attempt at pragmatic compromise between
strong competing demands. On one hand are the desires to have
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'1See CCH APB ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES §§ 510.08, 520.01-.07 (1973); SEC Ac-
counting Series Release No. 150, 5 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,172 (Dec. 20, 1973); cf.
Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1151,
1176-88 (1970). For a description of the FASB's procedures, see Armstrong, The Work
and Workings of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 29 Bus. LAW., March 1974, at
145 (special issue).
2 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FINANCIAL REPORTING IN UNITS OF
GENERAL PURCHASING POWER (Exposure Draft, Dec. 31, 1974) [hereinafter cited as
FASB EXPOSURE DRAFT].
3 The original proposal would have required the new standards to apply to fiscal
years beginning on or after Jan. 1, 1976. FASB EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 2, 57.
The Board, however, has delayed decision on adoption of the proposal until sometime
this year. Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1975, at 15, col. 1.
4 See ACCOUNTING RESEARCH DIVISION STAFF, AICPA, REPORTING THE FINANCIAL
EFFECTS OF PRICE-LEVEL CHANGES 24-27 (Accounting Research Study No. 6, 1963)
[hereinafter cited as ARS No. 6].
1013
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:1013
financial statements reflect current values of assets5 and to have
income for at least some purposes reflect charges based on re-
placement costs of assets.6 On the other hand is the need to have
accounting principles that deter management manipulation of
asset and earnings figures.
7
A reaction to the investor losses of the Great Depression was
insistence upon use of historical cost in financial statements" and
the requirement that no gains or losses be recognized until
realized by actual sale or some similarly objective measure. 9
These principles of accounting substantially lessened the possibil-
ity of puffing in financial statements, generally eliminating
write-ups of assets based on inaccurate appraisals. At the same
time, the increasing importance of income figures for investors
shifted attention away from the balance sheet, which no longer
reflected figures of much economic significance, and focused
attention on the income statement.' 0
But during periods of constantly spiraling inflation, income
statement figures based on historical costs also rapidly become
obsolete. So long as obsolescence was primarily confined to the
depreciation figure, management showed little concern." This
' See Edwards, The State of Current Value Accounting, 50 ACCOUNTING REv. 235
(1975).
Management's desire to reflect higher replacement costs, and thus show lower
income, is usually directed toward attempts to reduce income tax burdens. For this
reason, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 472(c), required that if last in, first out inventory
valuation is to be used for tax purposes, it must also be used for reporting to share-
holders and for credit purposes. Cf. Kripke, supra note 1, at 1189-90.
7 More precisely, this should be described as a concern for "objectivity" in the pre-
sentation of accounting data. See M. MOONITZ, THE BASIC POSTULATES OF ACCOUNTING
42-43 (Accounting Research Study No. 1, 1961).
' See Kripke, supra note 1, at 1188-89.
' Cf. Arnett, What Does "Objectivity" Mean to Accountants?, 111 J. ACCOUNTANCY, May
1961, at 63.
10 [T]he problems in the field of accounting have increasingly come to be con-
sidered from the standpoint of the buyer or seller of an interest in an enter-
prise, with consequent increased recognition of the significance of the income
statement .... With the increasing importance of the income statement there
has been a tendency to regard the balance sheet as the connecting link between
successive income statements ....
RESTATEMENT AND REVISION OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS 3, 2 CCH APB
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 6005 (Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, 1953) [hereinafter
cited as ARB No. 43]. See also Hayes, Accounting Principles and Investment Analysis, 30 L.
& CONTEMP. PROB. 752, 768 (1965); Graham, Some Observations on the Nature of Income,
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, and Financial Reporting, 30 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
652, 661-64 (1965). For an important discussion of the history, purposes, and future of
financial accounting, see Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy, 31
Bus. LAW. 293 (1975).
11 In the Preface to its Exposure Draft, the FASB states: "Despite a 1969 recommen-
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lack of interest may be explained in part by the fact that tradi-
tional depreciation accounting does roughly compensate for in-
creases in replacement costs. The failure to account for the gap
between depreciation reserves and replacement cost is offset by
the failure to recognize imputed income from interest-free use
of those reserves over the life of the depreciable asset. 12 The
impact of rapidly rising prices became more apparent, however,
when, with pricing based on replacement cost and accounting of
cost of goods sold based on a first in, first out method,' 3 earn-
ings surged with "inventory" profits. Often profit levels would
quickly fall to more normal levels in subsequent periods when
statements would reflect substantially higher costs of goods
sold. 14 The first reaction to this distortion was a rush by com-
panies to change from FIFO to LIFO accounting for inven-
tories.1 5 The impact of inflation on income, however, extends
beyond inventory problems. For example, interest rates on long-
term borrowing have risen dramatically to reflect the cheaper
dollars that are used in repayment. 16 But as fixed asset costs
rise even faster than interest rates the relationship between de-
preciation reserves and replacement costs has become so at-
tenuated as to lose all validity. As early as 1947, the accounting
profession recognized this serious impact on accounting for pro-
ductive facilities: "Stockholders, employees, and the general pub-
lic should be informed that a business must be able to retain out
of profits amounts sufficient to replace productive facilities at
current prices if it is to stay in business.
1' 7
Thus, rapid price increases, particularly in 1974, led to the
dusting-off of more general proposals to deal with monetary
dation of the Accounting Principles Board, few enterprises in the United States have
reported financial information expressed in units of general purchasing power.
FASB EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 2, at iii.
1 
See W. PATON, ESSENTIALS OF ACCOUNTING 534-35 (1938); Blum & Katz, Deprecia-
tion and Enterprise Valuation, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 236 (1965).
" For a description of first in, first out (FIFO) and last in, first out (LIFO) inven-
tory accounting see W. MEIGS, C. JOHNSON, T. KELLER & A. MOSICH, INTERMEDIATE
ACCOUNTING 257-61 (2d ed. 1968).
14 See Bastable & Merriwether, Fifo in an Inflationary Environment, 139 J.
ACCOUNTANCY, March 1975, at 49.
'5 See, e.g., Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1975, at 6, col. 3.
6 5ee Sommer, Inflation May Keep Interest Rates Up, IND. WEEK, July 1, 1974, at 45.
See also Hendershott & Van Home, Expected Inflation Implied by Capital Market Rates, 28
J. FIN. 301 (1973).
11 Letter from the Committee on Accounting Procedure, American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, to the profession, Oct. 14, 1948, reproduced at ARB No.
43, supra note 10, at ch. 9a, 17.
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inflation. These earlier proposals had surfaced in every inflatio-
nary period since World War J1.18 The FASB's new proposal,
however, has a dramatic new aspect-price-level adjustments in
supplemental statements would be mandatory for all businesses
that desire to have their financial statements certified as in ac-
cordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 19
The FASB proposal's response to inflation is not the only
one possible. An alternative is to adjust asset figures to reflect
specific price changes rather than indexes of general inflation.
This adjustment may employ either the current replacement cost
(the cost of new assets of equal productive capacity) or the cur-
rent value (the price of reproducing the existing assets in identi-
cal form).20 On August 21, 1975, the Securities and Exchange
Commission proposed amendments to its accounting rules, regu-
lation S-X,21 to require inclusion of certain current replacement
cost figures in financial statements. Footnotes would provide
these data for inventories and depreciable assets comprising the
productive capacity of the firm.22 As this Article suggests, a cur-
rent value or cost approach offers a much better possibility of
18 For a review of these proposals, see FASB EXPOSURE DPtArr, supra note 2,
58-63.
19 Id. 31.
20 The basic objective of the Commission in proposing to require replacement
cost data is to give investors information about the current economics of busi-
ness operations rather than the value of business assets. The disclosures pro-
posed do not represent a current value approach, although presumably assets
measured by current cost will more closely approximate current value than will
historical cost data.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5608, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 80,270, at
85,579 (Aug. 21, 1975) [hereinafter cited as SEC Securities Act Release No. 5608]. For
the SEC proposal, see note 22 infra & accompanying text.
21 17 C.F.R. pt. 210 (1975).
22 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5608, supra note 20. Final SEC staff recommen-
dations on the proposals are to be submitted to the Commission by May 1, 1976. Ad-
dress by SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills, AICPA Conference, Washington, D.C., Jan.
7, 1976, reproduced in BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 335 at E-1 (Jan. 14, 1975). The
proposal would require financial statements filed with the SEC to include in footnotes:
(1) the current replacement cost of inventories; (2) the cost effect of sales during the
past two years if costs current at the times of sales had been used; (3) the current cost
of replacing productive capacity together with current net replacement cost represented
by the depreciable, depletable, and amortizable assets; (4) depreciation, depletion, and
amortization for the past two years based on current replacement cost; (5) the methods
used in determining the above amounts; and (6) any other information necessary to
prevent the above information from being misleading (e.g., historical relationships
between cost changes and selling price changes, difficulties in replacing productive
capacity).
The SEC's proposal calls for the use of replacement cost, the amount necessary to
obtain equivalent operating or productive capacity, not cost of reproducing the existing
assets in identical form.
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accurately reflecting information investors wish to know23 than
does the FASB proposal.
General price-level adjustment proposals, such as the
FASB's, are a reaction to the primary difficulty with current cost
and value accounting-the lack of objective measures in many
instances.24 The spectre of fraudulent and excessive appraisals
of assets continues to haunt the accounting profession. The use
of general price level adjustments avoids this problem by focus-
ing upon a method of adjustment of values that is completely
beyond manipulation by individual enterprises. This method is
the adjustment of financial statements to reflect not actual cur-
rent costs or values, but rather the overall change in the purchas-
ing power of the dollar.25 Use of government-supplied indexes
unrelated to specific commodities provides an "objective" test of
decreases in the purchasing power of the dollar.26 And that test
fits into a perfectly logical academic model of economic report-
ing, one that measures results in terms of constant dollars.
The problem with the FASB proposal is that it yields a series
of financial statistics incomprehensible to the average investor.
2 7
This mass of information, even if understood by the average
investor, is unlikely to be seen as helpful. 28 The accounting
profession's half-step toward current value accounting may not
be better than none. Price-level accounting is a trap for the un-
wary and it is the unwary, the unsophisticated investor, to whom
the minimum required disclosure must be comprehensible
under current legal standards.
29
23 A current cost approach has been adopted in the United Kingdom for periods
beginning after Dec. 24, 1977. Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1975, at 15, col. 4.
24 For an attempt by the SEC to deal with potential liability on the part of persons
exercising judgment in making financial disclosures, see proposed rule 132 under the
Securities Act of 1933 and proposed rule 3b-6 under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Securities Act Release No. 5581, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 80,167 (Apr. 28, 1975) (liability for misleading projections of future revenues,
sales, net income, or earnings per share).
25 For a review of the historical development of asset valuation procedures, see M.
CHATFIELD, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING THOUGHT 231-53 (1974).
26 See Tierney, The Index Number Problem, in ARS No. 6, supra note 4, at 57-117.
27 Even current annual reports of corporations are largely not understood by the
small stockholder. See GEORGESON & Co., NEW TRENDS IN ANNUAL REPORT READERSHIP
4 (1972); note 119 infra & accompanying text.
28 Note 105 infra & accompanying text.
29 Although a widely quoted opinion states that shareholders need not be addressed
"as if they were children in kindergarten," Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 554
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), the average reasonable investor as well as the securities professional
must be able to understand the required disclosures. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also Panel Discussion, New
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From the lawyer's point of view, the FASB proposal raises
the question of how much deference the SEC and the courts
should show toward principles propounded by the accounting
profession 30 when determining whether particular disclosures
conflict with rule lOb-5 31 Although generally accepted account-
ing principles have significant weight with the SEC,32 adherence
to these principles does not necessarily meet the required stan-
dards of disclosures.
33
The prime utility of the FASB proposal is to encourage
reforms that will reduce the federal income tax burden in times
of inflation. 34 But presenting the information as part of finan-
cial statements disseminated to investors could violate the stan-
dards for disclosure developed under rule lOb-5. The explan-
ations required by the exposure draft35 may not be sufficient to
avoid misleading implications. Sufficient disclosure may be
impossible36 or so cumbersome and costly as to make price-level
accounting an inordinate drain on corporate resources in light of
the purposes the proposal will in fact serve.
37
The proposal may actually mandate the wrong disclosure.
Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offerings, 28 Bus. LAw. 505, 527-28 (1973)
(remarks of Harold Marsh, Jr.).
30 See notes 32-33 infra & accompanying text.
31 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
32 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150, 5 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,172 (Dec.
20, 1973) [hereinafter cited as ASR No. 150].
11 United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006
(1970); Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
856 (1952); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" The tax aspects of the proposal are discussed at notes 155-63 infra.
35 See FASB EXPOSURE DRAFr, supra note 2, 56.
36 Cf. Jerry W. Smith, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
78,856 (SEC staff letter, May 16, 1972); Ferris & Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,903 (SEC staff letter, Apirl 24, 1972) (finding no amount
of disclosure would remove the potential for deception in limited publication of the
performance of hypothetical accounts kept by investment advisers under the Investment
Advisers Act rules).
" See notes 155-63 infra & accompanying text.
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Once an issuer leaves the SEC accepted-as well as generally
accepted-accounting practice of using historical costs, present
value or replacement cost may surface as a material fact for
investors and may become the only safe harbor for accounting
practice.
I. THE FASB PROPOSAL
At the heart of the FASB proposal is a reexamination of the
traditional role of the dollar as a measuring unit in financial
statements. In measuring assets, liabilities, and changes in assets
and liabilities, accounting principles have assumed that the dollar
is a constant unit of measure, while, in fact, dollars from differ-
ent years reflect different amounts of purchasing power.38 Thus,
figures that are composites of transactions for different years
include dollars of varying values. The FASB proposal would
convert all financial statement figures to dollars of equal pur-
chasing power. Under the proposal current dollars, those as of
the date of the annual balance sheet, would be the common unit
of measurement.
3 9
The FASB has chosen to use the Gross National Product
Implicit Price Deflator to determine the purchasing power of the
dollar. 40 This index, compiled by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis of the Department of Commerce, is the most com-
prehensive index of prices in the United States. It includes all
goods and services, not merely those in a particular segment of
the economy. Thus it is a better measure of general purchasing
power of the dollar than such better known indexes as the Con-
sumer Price Index and the Wholesale Price Index.41 The GNP
Implicit Price Deflator equates 1958 dollars to an index number
of 100. By the fourth quarter of 1965 the index stood at 111.5.
By the third quarter of 1975, it had risen to 186.0.42
Unlike proposals that suggest adjustment of only certain
items in financial statements, such as depreciation,43 the FASB
"
8 See ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, BASIC CONCEPTS AND ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 165-68, 2
CCH APB ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 9088 (APA Statement No. 4, 1970).
11 FASB EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 2, 36.
40 Id. 35.
41 For a comprehensive discussion of indexes, see Tierney, supra note 26.
42 GNP Deflators beginning in 1929 are collected in FASB EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra
note 2, at 34-35. Recent figures through the third quarter of 1975, as revised, may be
found in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 55 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Nov. 1975, at S-2.43 See FASB EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 2, 73. See also ARS No. 6, supra note 4,
at 54-55. Examples of partial adjustments are contained in id. 211-18.
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proposal contemplates restatement of all figures in both balance
sheet and income statement.44 Although the Exposure Draft
permits less than a completely restated set of financial state-
ments, the items that are required entail virtually complete
restatements in working papers in order accurately to reflect
required disclosures. The income statement must show the fol-
lowing in general purchasing power units: revenues, deprecia-
tion, net gain or loss from holding monetary liabilities or assets,
net income in total and per share, and cash dividends per
share. 45 The restated balance sheet must show: inventories;
working capital; total property, plant, and equipment, net of
depreciation; total assets; and common shareholders' equity.
46
The proposal can best be understood by reconstructing sev-
eral figures from a set of financial statements to reflect price-
level adjustments. Assume Acme Widget Co. was formed on
January 1, 1970, at which time it purchased land costing $10,000
and a building with a thirty year anticipated life costing $90,000.
On a traditional balance sheet, assuming straight-line deprecia-
tion and no salvage value for the building, these items would
appear as follows as of the end of 1974:
Land $10,000
Building 90,000
Less: Depreciation 15,000
75,000
Restated in terms of 1974 fourth quarter dollars, they would
appear as follows:
Land $13,394
Building 120,542
Less: Depreciation 20,090
100,452
These price-level adjusted figures are reached by multiplying
historical figures by:
178.0 (GNP Deflator, Fourth Quarter 1974)
132.9 (GNP Deflator, First Quarter 1970)
This fraction represents the relation between current dollars and
dollars at the time the items were acquired. For assets acquired
44 FASB EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 2, 33, 73.
45 Id. 54.46 Id. 54-55.
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in other quarters the denominator would be the Gross National
Product Deflator for the quarter of acquisition. Similar restate-
ments would be made for other "nonmonetary"47 items.
Certain items, however, by law or contract represent a claim
on a fixed number of dollars, regardless of changes in purchas-
ing power. These items, such as cash, fixed-dollar receivables
and fixed-dollar liabilities, are not restated. Such items, labeled
"monetary" items by the FASB, instead result in gains or losses
to the holder during periods of price change.4 8 The company
that holds cash during inflationary periods effectively suffers
losses in purchasing power. On the other hand, holding mone-
tary liabilities results in gains because the debts will be repaid in
"cheaper" dollars.
Under the FASB proposal, gains and losses from holding of
monetary items are recognized in the year of the price change.
49
Thus, suppose Acme Widget held $50,000 in cash throughout
1974. It thereby suffers a purchasing power loss of $6,010 com-
puted as follows:
178_0a X 50,000 = 56,010c
15 8.9 b
56,010 - 50,000 =6,010
d
a (GNP Deflator, Fourth Quarter 1974)
b (GNP Deflator, Fourth Quarter 1973)
c (Amount in end of year dollars)
d (Loss)
Holding of debt results in comparable gain. Thus, the company
that is in a net liability position as to monetary items during a
period of inflation will experience purchasing power gains dur-
ing the period. Purchasing power gains or losses, appearing in
47 For a detailed classification of "monetary" and "nonmonetary" items, see id. 85.
48 See ARS No. 6, supra note 4, at 135-65.
49 FASB EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 2, 48. Some accountants have suggested
that gain on long-term debt (a monetary item) used to finance depreciable assets ought
to be recognized not in the year of general price level changes, but rather should be
spread over the life of the asset. The larger dollar amount of depreciation created by
price level adjustments would thus be reduced by offsetting against it the gains arising
from financing the purchase of assets rather than paying cash. See, e.g., Deupree, Ac-
counting for Gains and Losses in Purchasing Power of Monetary Items, in ARS No. 6, supra
note 4, at 153. The FASB has rejected this approach. See generally ARS No. 6, supra,
41-42; ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS RESTATED FOR GENERAL
PRICE-LEVEL CHANGES 41-42, 2 CCH APB ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 9015 (APB
Statement No. 3, 1969).
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the restated income statement as a separate item, reflect the
results of holding such monetary items each year.
Finally, these changes, of course, affect stockholders' equity
accounts. Under the FASB proposal, preferred stock "that is
carried in the balance sheet at an amount equal to its fixed
liquidation or redemption price"50 is classified as a monetary
item, that is, as a liability of fixed amount owed to holders.
Changes in purchasing power therefore affect almost exclusively
the common stockholders' equity.
51
The FASB proposal assumes that gains inuring to common
shareholders should be reflected proportionately in all the com-
mon stock accounts: capital stock, additional paid-in capital, and
retained earnings. Because restating each account separately
would involve the complexity of determining the date on which
each component of each account arose, the proposal finds it
sufficient to use a residual approach that aggregates all the
common stockholders' equity accounts in a single figure.
52
The FASB proposal contemplates that comparative figures
for two or more years will also be adjusted for price-level
changes.5 3 At the end of 1974, when Acme Widget wishes to
include in its annual report to shareholders comparative balance
sheets and income statements for 1973 and 1974, all figures that
had been entered in the 1973 statements in December 1973 dol-
lars are "rolled forward" to December 1974 dollars. Even
monetary items are restated solely for purposes of comparison.
If Acme held $50,000 in cash at the end of 1973, at the end of
1974 this is restated on the 1973 balance sheet at $56,010 in
1974 dollars. Thus if cash held in historical dollars did not
change, comparative balance sheets would show $6,010 less in
1974.54
50 FASB ExPoSURE DRAF-r, supra note 2, 37(c). Preferred stock that is not carried
at such amount is restated each year, but only until it reaches its "fixed liquidation
price." Id. 45.
5' The distribution of the equity in general purchasing power units is constantly
shifting because the preferred equity is a fixed number. This redistribution is made
directly into common stockholders' equity and is not included in the restated income
statement figure for gains and losses from the holding of fnonetary assets. The redis-
tribution is reflected in computations of restated net income per common share. Id.
49, 54(f) n.8.
52 Id. T 46.
53 Id. 53.
14 See id. The figure of $56,010 is derived from the computation at text following
note 49 supra.
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Past dividends are also rolled forward. In this way, a
shareholder who has received the same nominal amount in di-
vidends in two successive years is informed that dividends have
declined in terms of their general purchasing power. 55
II. THE STANDARDS OF DISCLOSURE
Should the FASB adopt its price-level proposal, the restated
financial statements would appear in the basic disclosure docu-
ments of every corporation. The issue, then, is whether the addi-
tional statements would aid disclosure or, rather, would prove so
confusing to the average investor as to be deemed misleading
under rule 10b-5 standards.
Technical competence in meeting the standards of a profes-
sion does not necessarily fulfill the requirements of disclosure.
56
An attorney who renders an accurate opinion on a contract's
legal form, when he knows the economic reality it purports to
represent does not exist, may be liable under rule lOb-5.5 7 Simi-
larly, an accountant who in fulfilling his responsibilities under
generally accepted accounting principles knows that economic
reality is not being portrayed, may also violate the rule.5 8 The
analysis, therefore, must center not on professional standards,
but on investor needs. As Judge MacMahon of the Southern
Distrikt of New York said, "Our inquiry is properly focused not
on whether [the accountants'] report satisfies esoteric accounting
norms, comprehensible only to the initiate, but whether the re-
port fairly presents the true financial position of [the company]
. . . to the untutored eye of an ordinary investor."59 He added,
"This duty cannot be fulfilled merely by following generally ac-
cepted accounting principles."60
As early as 1942, the SEC advanced the position that re-
liance upon generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) is
not a complete defense to charges of inadequate disclosure.
6'
" No provision is made for presentation of market price of shares adjusted for
general purchasing power changes.
56 See ASR No. 150, supra note 32.
-1 SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,331 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1975) (denial of motions for summary judgment).
5' United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006
(1970).
59 Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
6 Id. at 122. See also 43 COLO. L. REv. 51 (1971).
6' Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 11 S.E.C. 975, 1058-59 (1942).
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The unexplained application of GAAP may induce the average
investor to draw unwarranted inferences about company per-
formance. Knowledge of technical accounting rules may be
necessary to understand why such inferences should not be
drawn. For example, in Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co.,62 a Se-
curities Act case, the use of GAAP created a serious misunder-
standing.
Kaiser-Frazer's prospectus included a summary of earnings:
Period .................................................... N et Profit or Loss
Two months ended
November 30, 1947 ................................ 9,406,478
Quarter ended
December 31, 1947 (4) ........................... 13,415,86163
Footnote (4) stated that the information "reflects various sub-
stantial year end adjustments including provision for certain re-
serves and a material increase in inventories to conform to the
results of the complete physical inventory taken by the Corpora-
tion as of December 31, 1947."64 Although no separate De-
cember profit figure was stated, subtraction of the two-month
figure from the quarter figure indicated a December profit of
about $4 million. In fact, about $3.1 million of "December prof-
it" resulted from inventory adjustments not allocable to De-
cember. The court concluded:
The district court found that the "summary of con-
solidated sales and earnings for the final quarter of the
year 1947 .. .was computed in accordance with ac-
cepted accounting procedures," and that it was not mis-
leading. With this conclusion we cannot agree. For, re-
gardless of whether its accounting system was a sound
one, Kaiser-Frazer stated its earnings in such a way as to
represent that it had made a profit of about $4,000,000
in December 1947 .... The footnote that appeared in
the prospectus .. .was entirely insufficient [to disclose
the source of the putative profit]. No one reading it
would have been put on notice that the actual profit for
62 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952).
63 Id. at 841 (footnote omitted).
64 Id. at 842.
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December was less than a fourth of what was indicated
by the table.
65
In this case, the court suggested, additional footnotes beyond the
call of generally accepted accounting principles would have re-
solved the antifraud problem.
66
Neither the courts nor the SEC, however, has generally been
willing to accept as full disclosure information intelligible only to
sophisticated investors and professionals. 67 The issuer is free to
go beyond the minimum standards of full disclosure and to re-
veal information that requires professional analysis to be of aid
to the investor. 68 But such additional disclosure must be so struc-
tured as not to confuse the average investor.
69
An issuer's departure from a relatively acceptable mode of
disclosure, historical cost, may also shift the frontier of required
disclosure. Rule lOb-5 requires disclosure of "a material fact
65 Id. at 843 (footnote omitted).
66 "The source of the profit as stated in the prospectus for December could have
been readily disclosed by a footnote to the earnings table." Id.6 7 See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971); F. WHEAT, DIsCLOSURE TO INVESTORS 77-78 (1969); cf. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and
Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. Rzv. 254 (1972).
6" The proper resolution of the various interests lies in the inclusion of a clearly
written narrative statement outlining the major aspects of the offering and
particularly speculative elements, as well as detailed financial information
which will have meaning only to the expert.
Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Professional "middlemen" and their sifting and analysis of data have been assigned a
necessary role in the securities markets. See Cohen, Truth in Securities Revisited, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 1340, 1353, 1377-78 (1966); Sowards, The Wheat Report and Reform of Federal
Securities Regulation, 23 VAND. L. REV. 495, 498-502 (1970). But the role has been pro-
moted by unnecessary curtailment of the disclosure by the issuer of soft information,
analyses, projections, and plans. See Schneider, supra note 67.
69 See Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447 (10th Cir.
1968) (proxy statement). In that case the oil company failed to reveal information con-
cerning the potential of an offshore drilling tract. The court quoted with approval the
SEC amicus curiae brief:
[I]t is altogether probable that investors unfamiliar with the technical aspects of
the oil and gas business-and these would likely include most shareholders of
major oil companies such as here involved-would ignore or misconstrue the
technical but extremely significant difference between "proved" and "probable"
oil reserves. Investors might well regard the two as interchangeable, which they
definitely are not, and would attribute to any numerical estimates of probable
reserves a degree of certainty which is not warranted."
Id. at 451.
Although the SEC suggested the information was conceivably allowable, the court
said inclusion of the information could have been a violation of disclosure standards.
Both court and SEC said non-disclosure was permissible.
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necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading
.... "70 Disclosure beyond the minimum may require other
disclosure; 71 hinting at facts may make those facts, not thereto-
fore deemed material, material.
In testing the FASB draft the crucial question is whether the
proposal would give the average investor comprehensible infor-
mation that is relevant, complete, and not so confusing as to
mislead.
III. DISCLOSURE AND THE FASB PROPOSAL
If the FASB draft is adopted, the limited explanations in the
form of captions and footnotes anticipated by the Board may
prove not to be sufficient or appropriate disclosure. The pro-
posal may fail in two respects. First, assuming arguendo a legiti-
mate use for price-level statements, explanations of the differ-
ences between price-level and current value or replacement cost
accounting may fail unless they describe the exact quantitative
differences. Second, actual appreciated values are material in-
formation not currently disclosed solely because of accounting
convention. Once the well-known historical cost convention is
breached, that material information itself, not merely a loose
approximation such as price-level adjustments, must be disclosed.
A. Failure to Explain
Once the restated figures are set out, the average investor
probably will draw unwarranted inferences as to current asset
values. The FASB draft recognizes this problem. As a solution,
the draft calls for a footnote disclaiming any similarity to re-
placement cost, liquidation value, or any other current value
method of accounting. 72 Yet with that disclaimer the investor is
left at large. The suggested footnote says:
Amounts shown in this summary of financial informa-
tion stated in units of general purchasing power are the
corresponding dollar amounts restated as if the transac-
tions underlying the financial statements had taken
place in dollars whose general purchasing power was
70 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1975).
71 Cf. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971).
712 FASB EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 2, at 68.
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equivalent to the general purchasing power of the dol-
lar [in current dollars].
73
With such verbiage the average investor could, if he reads the
note at all,74 easily assume that if the company had to use today's
dollars today, it would have to spend the restated amount to
replace a given asset. That is exactly the wrong inference. Only
by coincidence will changes in general price levels accurately
reflect the changes in actual value of specific assets.75 The supply
and demand factors that produce a particular price for a particu-
lar good do not vary over time in a set relationship to the general
economy, which is measured by the GNP Implicit Price
Deflator.7 6 The price of a good may fluctuate at a rate or even in
a direction different from that of the deflator.
For example, the GNP Implicit Price Deflator rose 10.2% in
1974 over 1973. For the same period indexes of specific com-
modity prices often reflected greater gains: 77
Wholesale Prices 19.0%
Industrial Commodities
(wholesale excluding foodstuffs) 22.0%
Farm Products, Processed
Foods and feeds (wholesale) 11.5%
Energy (gasoline, oil, fuel,
ice, electricity, gas) 30.4%
Consumer Price Index 11.0%
Further generalized descriptions probably would not clarify
the statements.78 Perhaps detailed footnotes explaining specific
73 Id.
'4 See notes 118-20 infra & accompanying text.
75Id. 8.
76 Cf. ARS No. 6, supra note 4, at 6-8.
77 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 55 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Jan. 1975, at 8 (pre-
liminary figures differing slightly from the revised indexes). Separating actual value
from price-level effects would be much simpler if some historic purchasing power unit,
say the 1929 dollar, were selected. Using the word dollar itself may be unwise, if the goals
of price level accounting have been accurately portrayed. See FASB EXPOSURE DRAFT,
supra note 2, 65-69.
78 Such generalized statements would probably contribute to a much lamented
trend:
In at least some instances, what has developed in lieu of the open disclos-
ure envisioned by the Congress is a literary art form calculated to communicate
as little of the essential information as possible while exuding an air of total
candor. Masters of this medium utilize turgid prose to enshroud the occasional
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disparities between current sale price or replacement value and
price-level value would be helpful. 79 But the question arises how
refined the footnotes must be. These disclosing footnotes even-
tually could become a third set of figures based on replacement
or sale value. Even if all the current values need not be disclosed,
someone must be paid to appraise and certify that the general
price-level information does not distort current values. Nor is
asset valuation the sole area of distortion that would require
additional disclosure. Serious problems emerge with accounting
for income80 and for shareholder equity.8' And at this high cost,
probably higher than that required under the SEC's own
proposal,8 2 the benefit of price-level accounting is relatively in-
substantial.
Price-level adjusted data have rarely been deemed relevant
by those who have had the opportunity to use such information.
A 1972 study by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accoun-
tants concluded:
In Canada, both accountants and users display little in-
terest in price-level restated reports. The latter remark
is not based on an extensive empirical investigation, but
rather is the view expressed to the author by many peo-
ple interviewed-including officials of two companies
which incurred the cost of introducing price-level re-
critical revelation in a morass of dull, and-to all but the sophisticates-useless
financial and historical data.
Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
79 The need for such explanations is generated in part by a seemingly off-handed
choice of the exposure draft. The unit of measurement chosen is the general purchas-
ing power of the dollar at the most recent balance sheet date. FASB ExPOSURE DRAFTr,
supra note 2, 36. But using current dollars is not necessary to the purported goals of
the proposal. See id. 7, 9. Why not call the unit a "GPPU"or a "shrdlu" to dispell
confusion? "[Ilt would be desirable to abandon the word ...- since that word mislead-
ingly connotes some moderately rational judgment-and to substitute some neutral
term, devoid of misleading associations, such as "aluation," or, perhaps better still,
'woosh-woosh.'" Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 161 F.2d 413,
450 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947). But such
options would not mesh with the tax reform goals that remain implicit in the proposal.
See notes 155-63 infra & accompanying text.
11 See notes 121-28 infra & accompanying text.
81 See notes 129-54 infra & accompanying text.
82 The SEC has specifically solicited comment on two possible cost saving devices.
First, the Commission has asked about labeling the replacement costs "unaudited," in
order to reduce the costs of using independent public accountants. Second, the SEC has
asked about limiting the requirement of disclosure to larger companies. SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5608, supra note 20, at 85,578.
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stated reports, but would not incur the small cost of
maintaining the system for a second year.
8 3
Apparently American management feels similarly. The FASB
draft states that few businesses in the United States have used
price-level reporting despite extensive literature calling attention
to it.
84
Whether it be the SEC or the accounting profession, guard-
ians of the public interest are wont to give more information
than investors wish to have. No more than a waste of paper
would be involved were it not for the overall confusion gener-
ated by such surplusage.
B. Current Value or Replacement Cost as
Material Information Disclosure of Which is Necessary to
Avoid Misleading Investors
1. Assets
The difficulties with the FASB proposal's approach to asset
valuation also illustrate a legitimate need of investors: the ability
to determine current values of assets held and used by a corpo-
ration. If investors need balance sheets reflecting market values,
but rules of accounting assure that such values are not reflected,
an inevitable clash arises between accounting principles and the
full disclosure provisions of the federal securities laws. 85 Indeed,
several cases, although generally read more narrowly, indicate
that in inflationary times disclosure of current value or replace-
ment cost may be almost a necessity.
86
Several major cases have dealt with the question of the dis-
closure required by federal securities law when a corporation
holds substantially appreciated assets. Unfortunately these cases
have had atypical fact patterns. Because of the peculiar positions
of the companies, realization of the appreciation was possible
only through sales outside the normal course of business. From
these cases the notion has emerged that only imminent liquida-
83 L. ROSEN, CURRENT VALUE ACCOUNTING AND PRICE-LEVEL RESTATEMENTS 50
(1972).
84 FASB EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 2, 58.
85 See Manne, Accounting and Administrative Law Aspects of Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 15 N.Y.L.F. 304, 318-19 (1969). See also M. BACKER, CURRENT VALUE ACCOUNTING
79-105 (1973).
88 See notes 87-120 infra & accompanying text.
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tion or a similar situation makes current asset values material to
investors. This reading, however, is too narrow. A more appro-
priate reading is that disclosure of appreciated values is re-
quired when it is likely that such values will be realized, but
only if the values may be ascertained with reasonable certainty.
This broader reading recognizes the need to account for infla-
tion, but casts doubt upon the propriety of techniques suggested
by the FASB.
Speed v. Transamerica Corp.8 7 focused on the non-disclosure
of the market value of the Axton-Fisher Tobacco Corporation's
inventories, which had dramatically appreciated in value. Trans-
america purchased shares of Axton-Fisher in a general tender
offer without disclosing the appreciation. The court found a
violation of rule lOb-5 because at the time Transamerica made
the offer to purchase, it intended to use the controlling interest
it would obtain to realize the appreciation by liquidating Axton-
Fisher.
The non-disclosure of the inventory profit accord-
ing to historical and orthodox practices may have had
little significance-considered abstractly. The reason
could be urged that while such fact might not be known
to each individual shareholder, it would, however, be
known in tobacco and financial circles. This knowledge
would, of necessity, be reflected or discounted in the
price at which the stocks sold on the public exchanges.
In fact, plaintiffs and the SEC both reluctantly admitted
the asset or real value would not be a significant factor
in the absence of a plan to liquidate, etc .... Had there
been no plan to liquidate, etc., Transamerica could have
given information on both the vastly improved earnings
of Axton-Fisher and the vastly increased value of the
tobacco leaf industry [sic] and still secure the stock at
about the stated [tender-offer] prices, which were sub-
stantially above the market value.88
Under normal conditions this abstraction is, of course, non-
sense. If the tobacco had increased greatly in value, its future
sale in the ordinary course of business at higher prices would
create increased profits. Such anticipated increase in future
earnings would have driven up the price of Axton-Fisher stock.
87 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), modified and aff d, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
8 81d. at 825-26 (footnote omitted).
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But Axton-Fisher was not operating under normal condi-
tions. It was subject to a ninety percent excess profits tax, so that
the increase in value could not be realized in the ordinary course
of business.8 9 Transamerica was advised that through liquidation
of a controlled corporation whose stock had been purchased, the
tobacco could be distributed in kind to shareholders (primarily
Transamerica) at capital gains rates. 90 Resale of the tobacco
would not produce excess profits, presumably, because its basis
would be the fair market value at the date of distribution by
Axton-Fisher to Transamerica.9 In this situation the court was
correct in stating that the inventory appreciation would have
little significance absent the possibility of liquidation. In this case,
failure to disclose appreciation materially misled investors as to
potential future profits. Absent the excess profits tax, failure to
disclose appreciation also would have misled investors about po-
tential future profits, regardless of liquidation plans.
Speed also implies that following FIFO accounting-an
analogue to historical cost-in severely inflationary times may be
misleading in that it conceals the impossibility of sustaining the
inflated profit levels. A company with appreciated FIFO inven-
tory can, by raising prices, report a large profit in the year in
which the sale of such inventory takes place. If similar apprecia-
tion does not continue, the company has earned a one-time pro-
fit that should not be taken as an indication of future profits.
Perhaps only disclosure of actual changes in value would make
clear the nature of the reported profits. 92
Appreciated capital assets were central to the decision in
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.9 3 Gamble-Skogmo acquired General
Outdoor Advertising Co. by merger in 1963. From 1961 to 1963,
General was the largest company in the outdoor advertising bus-
iness in the United States. It operated thirty-six branches and
owned about 600 parcels of real estate on which its facilities and
offices were located.94 In 1961, General's business declined, and
in 1962 General began to sell its plants. It was able to realize
89 Id. at 823, 837-38; see Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 202, 56 Stat. 899 (re-
pealed 1945).
90 99 F. Supp. at 823.
91 At least the district court so assumed. Id. at 838.
92 Cf. Bowman & Bourdon, Inc. v. Rohr, 296 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd
per curiam, 417 F.2d 780 (1st Cir. 1969).
93 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), modified and aff'd, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir.
1973).
94 Id. at 74.
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amounts well in excess of book values of the properties. 95 This
appreciation was apparently due to the purchasers' ability to
operate the plants more efficiently, to realize a larger cash flow
from the properties, and to take greater tax deductions than
could General. The properties had been almost fully depreciated
for tax purposes by General. 96 The purchasers obtained a new
tax basis upon purchase and could take larger depreciation de-
ductions.
Rule 14a-997 under section 14 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193498 prescribes full disclosure standards for proxy sol-
icitations analoguous to those of rule 10b-5. At issue in Gerstle
was whether the merger proxy statement sent to General
shareholders was misleading in failing to disclose sufficiently the
appreciated values of General's properties, in failing to disclose
sufficiently its plans to continue to sell these properties, or both.
The SEC, relying on its brief in Speed, 99 took the position
that asset appreciation must be disclosed if "liquidation of those
assets is intended or can reasonably be anticipated."' 00 The
court, on the other hand, read Speed more narrowly. Current
value could be disclosed only because the tobacco "was actively
traded and ... market value could be ascertained with reasona-
ble certainty on the basis of actual sales. No 'appraisal' of market
value was required, and the dangers that the SEC has perceived
in the disclosure of appraised values were not present."'' 1
Somewhat inconsistently, the court nevertheless found that
General's proxy statement was materially misleading.
We rest our decision on the point that . . . the Proxy
Statement must be faulted, on traditional grounds
going back to the Speed case. . as failing adequately to
disclose that, upon completion of the merger, Skogmo
intended to pursue aggressively the policy of selling
[General's] plants, which had already yielded such a
substantial excess of receipts over book value.'
0 2
Of course the information relating to intent to sell would be
9 See id. at 76-81, 85-89.
96 Id. at 77.
97 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1975).
98 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
99 478 F.2d at 1293.
"' Id. at 1291. See also Manne, supra note 85, at 307, 308, 320, 323.
101 478 F.2d at 1293.
102 Id. at 1295.
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meaningful to investors only if they realized that plant selling
prices exceeded book value. To avoid misleading omissions, full
disclosure would also reveal the price, exactly what the court
indicated was not required to be set out.
10 3
As in Speed, the situation in Gerstle was one in which the
corporation could realize the increased asset values only by sale
other than in the ordinary course of business. General could not
duplicate the economies available to potential purchasers; it
could not obtain the depreciation write-offs open to purchasers.
More typically, appreciation of capital assets can be realized
by means other than liquidation. Competitors who have been
required to assemble capital assets at higher prices will be unable
to compete effectively so either sales may rise or prices may be
increased to reflect more closely those of competitors who en-
tered the industry when acquisition costs were higher. Thus, to
the investor appraising future earnings, appreciation is an im-
portant factor. The high profit figures are misleading, though,
as predictors for the long run. Replacement of capital assets at
higher costs soon ends the advantage to a going concern of asset
appreciation. The depreciation charges based on lower historical
costs result in higher profits than can be expected in later
periods when depreciation is based on the cost of replacement
assets.
Speed and Gerstle, then, may represent the application to
atypical situations of a rule that merits broader application:
Where appreciation of asset value is likely to be realized, it is
misleading under the standards prescribed by rule lOb-5 and
comparable provisions not to disclose current values of assets.
Liquidation was critical to Speed and Gerstle only because it was
the sole method of realization. But with a rule stated this
broadly, the well-accepted use of historical cost is improper.
Although the argument against historical cost itself may be
strong, the thesis here is narrower. Historical cost may be de-
fended as having its distortions justified in most cases by a long
history of custom and convention. We may assume that the aver-
age investor is aware of this system of accounting. He may not
understand why it is used nor think much of its utility, but he
knows that it creates distortions and that he should place little
reliance on the balance sheet it produces. No other method,
price-level accounting in particular, has such a long history. A
"'Id. at 1302.
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system proposing to depart from tradition must put forward
justifications more convincing than those offered by the estab-
lished historical cost approach. 10 4 The new system has not made
an implicit full disclosure through custom and convention.
John C. Burton, the SEC's Chief Accountant, has made a
similar analysis:
Not only will PuPU accounting [an acronym for
accounting in "purchasing power units"] suffer all the
disabilities of any historical cost system, but it will have
an additional significant potential for misleading inves-
tors arising out of the fact that it will appear to be an
improvement when it is in fact not. This danger is par-
ticularly acute if the PuPU system is annointed [sic] by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board as constitut-
ing significant and valuable new information.
05
The acuteness of the danger is emphasized by the limited
theoretical usefulness to investors of a price-level system. A re-
port of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants con-
cluded: "Probably the only situation where price-level restate-
ments would be a sensible choice would be when inflation was so
rapid that a strong statistical relationship developed between re-
stated costs and such needed sums as replacement cost or resale
prices."' 
0 6
Thus a departure from historical cost mandates a disclosure
that provides significant material information to the investor.
Price-level accounting does not suffice. It only mutates the dis-
tortions of historical cost; it does not transcend them. The re-
form cannot go only halfway.
10 7
The opinion of the district court in SEC v. Bangor Punta
Corp.'08 supports this conclusion. In a 1964 merger, Bangor
104 An appropriate analogy is the "good samaritan rule" of tort law. Though one
has no duty to assist an injured or endangered person, once one undertakes to do so he
must act with reasonable care. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 323 (1965).
Such assistance may cause other potential rescuers to refrain from acting, in reliance
upon the aid apparently being rendered. Once the investor is told he is being saved
from the traps of historical cost, there appears a duty to provide a reasonable rescue,
not one replete with new, undisclosed traps. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
105 Burton, Financial Reporting in an Age of Inflation, 139 J. ACCOUNTANCY, Feb.
1975, at 68, 70; see Burton, Accounting that Allows for Inflation, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 30,
1974, at 12, 14.
106 L. ROSEN, supra note 83, at 8.
107 See notes 78-82 supra & accompanying text.
108 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Chris-Craft
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Punta had acquired ninety-eight percent of the stock of Bangor
and Aroostock Railroad, which had been among the assets of the
company acquired by Bangor Punta. Generally accepted ac-
counting principles would have permitted Bangor Punta to place
the railroad stock on its balance sheet at the amount given for it
in the merger-$29.8 million. 10 9 Instead, Bangor Punta chose to
carry forward the book value of the railroad stock as it appeared
on the books of the acquired company-$8.1 million-because of
a strong possibility that the railroad stock would be sold im-
mediately. The sale would have produced a large loss if the cost
of the stock were recorded at $29.8 million. When the sale did
not take place, Bangor Punta in 1965 obtained an appraisal of
the railroad and, consistent with that appraisal, carried its in-
vestment in the railroad at $18.4 million.
Several years later, while Bangor Punta was negotiating to
sell its railroad stock for $5 million, it filed with the SEC a regist-
ration statement that continued to carry the Railroad stock at
$18.4 million. At the time of the filing, the court found, a sale at
the $5 million offered was not yet a reasonable probability.
Nevertheless, the court found that Bangor Punta had violated
rule IOb-5.
The Court is aware of no principle of accounting or
of fair disclosure which would justify a failure to up-
date a constructed carrying figure which may have re-
flected approximate fair value in 1965 but which was
almost four times the offer of a willing buyer (and the
only willing buyer) in 1969 . . . . Consistency of fair
disclosure required exposure of circumstances which so
clearly rendered obsolete an appraisal made four years
earlier.
The Court concludes that the registration statement...
was misleading in its failure to disclose the circums-
tances surrounding the negotiations for sale of the
[railroad] interest. In so holding especial note is taken
of the unique "valuation" nature of the $18.4 million
figure .... The present conclusion is not necessarily to
be taken as applicable in cases where book carrying fig-
Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 383 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
910, 924 (1973).
109 331 F. Supp. at 1156.
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ures are in accordance with principles of conventional
transactional accounting .... 110
The court appears to be saying that carrying the stock at the
even more inflated figure of $29.8 million, in accordance with
historical costs, may not have been misleading. But once depar-
tures from historical cost are made, it appears that a partial
adjustment that does not reflect true current value is insufficient
disclosure."'
The Second Circuit, considering the case on appeal, ac-
cepted the conclusion below that the $18.4 million figure was
materially misleading. A majority nevertheless affirmed the
lower court's refusal to grant an injunction."' Dissenting on that
issue, Judge Timbers described the balance sheet figure as
"unrealistic."'1 3 Implicit in that description seems to be the no-
tion that book value should reflect current market value-a
proposition contrary to presently accepted accounting principles.
Judge Mansfield, one of the majority on this issue, accepted the
appraised figure as "misleading," but found Bangor Punta's fail-
ure to round out the picture insufficiently flagrant. "A person
able to read a balance sheet would probably have recognized that
such 'historical' cost did not necessarily represent current li-
quidating value."' 1 4 But the figure at issue was not historical
cost, and that fact undercuts the judge's assumption of financial
literacy.
Literature aimed solely at professional accountants provides
strong evidence that confusion will be widespread among aver-
age investors. Caveats to avoid confusing general price level
changes with current market values are repeatedly included.
The FASB draft itself indicates that "hundreds of articles and a
number of books and research studies have been written on the
subject [of price-level accounting]."" 5 Despite this, the third
paragraph of the preface cautions its professional readers: "Ex-
pressing financial information in units of general purchasing
power should not be confused with the proposal that financial
10 d, at 1161-62.
111 Cf. M. BACKER, supra note 85, at 105.
112Judge Timbers wrote the opinion for the court, but dissented on the issue of
refusal to grant an injunction. Judge Gurfein and Judge Mansfield formed the majority
on that issue. 480 F.2d at 384-90 & n.38, 393-95, 403-07.
1 3 Id. at 388; see id. at 366-69.
"4 Id. at 406; see id. at 404.
115 FASB EXPOSURE DRAFr, supra note 2, 58.
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statements reflect changes in the specific prices ('current values')
of goods held or obligations owed by an enterprise while they
are held or owed.""
16
The FASB's answer to this confusion is to add in footnote
form an explanation of price-level procedures, including a
statement to the effect that the figures "do not purport to rep-
resent selling price, replacement cost, or any other measure of
the current value of the assets or the prices at which transactions
would take place currently."
117
One survey concluded that the average small shareholder
spends just under fifteen minutes on the entire annual report of
a corporation in which he has invested." 8 Another survey of
investors with at least one round-lot investment in a listed com-
pany indicated that only 34.9 percent of the respondents read
somewhat thoroughly the footnotes to the financial statements
in annual reports that they receive." 9 In light of these findings
it is unrealistic to assume that the proposed footnote reference
will change investor impressions of balance sheet figures. As one
analyst said of typical investors, "They barely if at all understand
current financial statements, and to give them another set would
thoroughly confuse and often mislead them."'20
2. Income and Management Performance
The use of price-level adjustments in the income statement
is an attempt to factor out increases in income caused only by
inflation, by, for example, adjusting depreciation charges and
inventory costs. It is also an attempt to reflect real changes in
general purchasing power of the company that arise from hold-
ing monetary items. As with the balance sheet, the restated in-
come statement may mislead investors more than if no adjust-
ments were made.
The first source of possible confusion in the use of such
adjusted income statements is the tenacity with which investors
hold to traditional measures of financial performance. The aver-
age investor is accustomed to profits being measured in dollars
116 Id. iii.
117 Id. 68.
118 GEORGESON & Co., supra note 27, at 4.
"' M. EPSTEIN, THE USEFULNESS OF ANNUAL REPORTS TO CORPORATE SHARE-
HOLDERS 39 (1975).
120 Gerald I. White, financial analyst at Sterling, Grace & Co., New York, quoted in
Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1975, at 42, col. 2.
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of different and indeterminable purchasing power. He has in-
ternalized the notion that profit figures must be viewed in light
of changed purchasing power. A subjective adjustment is no
doubt made. But formalizing this adjustment may cause more
confusion than do the present reporting practices.
More specific and technical objections attack the underlying
assumptions of price-level income measurement. William Brad-
ford has pointed out, for instance, that an assumption of the
FASB proposal-that inflation is unanticipated-will lead to in-
accurate evaluations of management performance.' 2 '
Under the FASB proposal, any company in a net monetary
asset position realizes general purchasing power losses. 122 But
the holding of net monetary assets may not result in real
economic loss if management performs well. "If the interest rate
on monetary items has been adjusted to compensate exactly for
an inflation, then the firm will not lose or gain from holding
monetary items.' 23 The FASB proposal provides information
insufficient to determine whether management has done a good
job or a poor one in anticipating inflation and dealing with it.
The proposed method of reporting could grossly mislead inves-
tors concerned with separating management's operational per-
formance from its financial performance in dealing with rising
price levels. Two examples illustrate the point.
Suppose that in a year in which general price levels rise by
ten percent, Company X holds net monetary liabilities of
$500,000. A general price level gain of $50,000 would be re-
corded on the income statement. Assume, however, that X's cre-
ditors, anticipating inflation, raised interest charges on X's oblig-
ations by $60,000. Management, by borrowing at these increased
rates, has caused the corporation to suffer an economic loss. The
additional $60,000 interest expense would, of course, show up in
the income statement, but it would be attributable to operational
costs, not to inflation. Even though the bottom line income
statement figure will remain the same whether or not gains and
losses on monetary items are shown separately from operating
gains and losses, the separate income statement classification of
these items would create the appearance that management has
dealt skillfully with inflation. In fact, it has managed its affairs in
121 Bradford, Price-Level Restated Accounting and the Measurement of Inflation Gains and
Losses, 49 ACCOUNTING REV. 296 (1974).
12 See FASB EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 2, 76.
123 Bradford, supra note 121, at 298.
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the face of anticipated inflation rather poorly by failing to pre-
dict more accurately that creditors had overestimated future
general price-level increases.
12 4
Suppose management of Company Y, finding itself in the
position of a net creditor, raises its interests charges to borrowers
(or reduces the time in which customers can pay without penalty
charges). Company Y's price-level income statement would show
a general purchasing power loss because the company holds net
monetary assets. The offsetting gains from increasing interest in
anticipation of inflation would appear at best in other income
items. Some adjustments might not appear at all. If, for instance,
management forces credit customers to pay more promptly, no
increase in income would appear because the opportunity cost of
extending credit for longer periods is not stated explicitly under
normal accounting practice. 12 5 Again management's skill, or lack
thereof, in dealing with inflation would be submerged in figures
other than general purchasing power gains and losses. This may
be no worse theoretically than the present state of affairs. The
investor, however, would be presented once again, without ade-
quate justification, a set of figures containing misleading implica-
tions.
An additional objection to the FASB proposal focuses upon
assumptions concerning the particular company's investment or
reinvestment policies. As we have already observed, 26 adjust-
ment of depreciation charges on a basis other than replacement
cost of assets creates an inaccurate starting point for predicting
future income. 127 A similar problem exists with reporting price-
level gains and losses from holding monetary items. Such gain or
loss is in effect the difference between the current claim in dol-
lars of such items and the claim the corporation would have in
dollars had it held nonmonetary assets instead. Thus a company
that suffers a purchasing power loss by holding cash could avoid
that loss by investing in inventory or capital assets. Attributing
purchasing power gains or losses to companies in this manner
assumes that they had opportunities to invest in assets that
124 Bradford considers in detail mathematical representations of price-level gains
and losses in the context of anticipated inflation. Id.
12. Cf. id. 300.
126 Text following note 103 supra. But cf. Comment, Depreciation in the Courts, 9
LAND & WATER L. REv. 633, 640-44 (1974).
127 See Revsine & Weygandt, Accounting for Inflation: The Controversy, 138 J.
ACCOUNTANCY, Oct. 1974, at 72, 76.
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change in exact accordance with the GNP Implicit Price De-
flator. In fact, few companies, other than perhaps the largest
conglomerates, have the option of investing in such diverse areas
of the economy as would be required to match overall GNP
changes.
12 8
If a company is in the business of selling electrical ap-
pliances at retail, it may alter its position in monetary items
primarily by changing inventory levels. It may purchase more
inventory to lessen monetary assets or purchase less inventory to
reduce monetary liabilities. If it anticipates that the price level in
historical dollars of electrical appliances will drop by one percent
in the next year, even though general prices levels will rise by ten
percent, assuming no alternative investments, management
ought to hold cash rather than purchase extra inventories. Such
proper economic conduct, though, would generate purchasing
power losses for the year in price-level financial statements. In-
vestment in an asset whose historical-dollar price is increasing at
six percent a year would be better economically than retention of
monetary assets and would also eliminate a "holding loss," al-
though in general purchasing unit terms the investor would still
be falling behind inflation. Computing holding gains or losses
thus diverts the reader of the financial statement from measur-
ing the true ability of management to cope with inflation.
To the average investor, the FASB's proposal offers a half-
way step toward more accurate measurement of management
performance. But again, a partial adjustment that induces re-
liance by investors on its accuracy in terms of real economic and
managerial results may be worse than retaining the present fig-
ures that at least are understood to be deficient in some respects.
3. Shareholders' Equity
The FASB proposal also poses considerable disclosure prob-
lems in the reporting of shareholders' equity. The shareholders'
equity accounts, in separating retained earnings from capital
stock and paid-in surplus, generally isolate funds that may leg-
ally be distributed to shareholders as dividends. 129 Legally the
amount available for distribution is the amount defined by the
128 Id. 76-78.
129 Accounting practice uses legal definitions of par value and stated value to de-
termine entries in capital stock and paid-in surplus accounts. See, e.g., H. SELLIN,
ATTORNEY'S HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING 4-4 to 4-5 (1971).
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applicable corporation statute as available for dividends. 130
Economically, the maximum amount that ought to be distributed
is that which permits the business to continue operating at its
present physical levels, that is, the amount available after meet-
ing expenses and creating a fund for replacement of assets. 13x
The FASB proposal measures neither of these amounts ade-
quately.
Some have suggested that present dividend law should be
interpreted to incorporate price-level adjustments. 3 2 Their
rationale embodies the economist's notion of capital. It suggests
that the amount available for dividends should be restricted by
the higher depreciation charges (and resulting lower earnings)
required by price-level restatements, because the higher charges
are necessary to preserve sufficient capital for asset replacement.
This concern with business continuation, however, is primarily
one of shareholders. It is relevant to dividend regulation only to
the extent that state legislatures intend dividend statutes to pro-
tect shareholders as well as creditors.
Some commentators have indeed suggested that modern di-
vidend statutes are intended to protect shareholders as well as
creditors.'3 3 But, at best, shareholder protection is only a sub-
sidiary aspect of dividend control, and to characterize present
dividend law as embodying notions of price-level adjustments in
order to protect shareholders seems clearly incorrect.'3 4 Divi-
dend restrictions are primarily intended to protect creditors.' 3 5
130 See, e.g., H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 320-21 (2d ed.
1970).
131 The point is often made in connection with the question of appropriate depre-
ciation charges. See, e.g., 1 A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 546-51
(5th ed. 1953); Revsine & Weygandt, supra note 127, at 75.13 2 See Finn, Price-Level Accounting for Corporate Dividends, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 59
(1972); Comment, Significance of Appreciation and Changing Price Levels in Corporate Div-
idend Policies, 35 MICH. L. REv. 286, 287, 289 (1936).
"' See, e.g., H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 572 (rev. ed. 1946); Hackney, The Fi-
nancial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1364-65
(1957). This notion finds support, for example, in statutes requiring shareholder con-
sent to the use of capital surplus as a dividend source. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 46(b) (rev. ed. 1969).34 See Dean, Provision for Capital Exhaustion Under Changing Price Levels, 65 HARV. L.
REv. 1339, 1340-43 (1952).
135 See, e.g., Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436 (No. 17, 944) (C.C.D. Me. 1824).
Dividend limitations have been described as attempts to protect the corporation's capital
"for the benefit of third parties who deal with it." ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. § 45(a), 2, at 890 (2d ed. 1971). Statutes often provide protection for preferred
shareholders' liquidation preferences. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 21
(rev. ed. 1969), which specifies that no portion of the consideration received for no-par
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Dividend statutes assume that creditors rely upon the liqui-
dation potential of the business; the statutes do not direct them-
selves to creditor concern about continued income. These
assumptions may be unrealistic. The state corporation law guar-
antees only that a fixed-dollar amount, decided upon by the
entrepreneurs, will not be distributed to shareholders in the
form of dividends. 3 6 Dividend statutes are essentially disclo-
sure statues, requiring of incorporators, in the words of Gilbert
and Sullivan, only "a public declaration to what extent they mean
to pay their debts.'
137
Just as the dollar amount owed to creditors does not change
as general price levels rise, so the nominal dollar cushion protect-
ing the obligation remains constant.' 3s Thus, to the extent that
retained earnings accounts are diminished by price-level ad-
justed depreciation charges, those accounts cease to approximate
the amount legally available for dividends.
Nor do the accounts reflect the reserves necessary for asset
replacement. The disparity between specific price-level changes
and general price-level changes again prevents any but chance
correlation between the decreases in retained earnings and the
increases in replacement costs of specific assets. 139 Accountants
have always disclaimed any intent to create a replacement fund
in making annual depreciation charges, 40 and general price-
level adjustments to historical costs are not put forward as chang-
preferred shall be allocated tQ capital surplus until the full amount of the preferred's
preference upon involuntary liquidation is placed in stated capital.
1
0 6 See H. HATFIELD, SURPLUS AND DIVIDENDS 3-5 (1943).
137 The full stanza from Utopia Limited is:
Some seven men form an Association
(If possible, all Peers and Baronets),
They start off with a public declaration
To what extent they mean to pay their debts.
That's called their Capital: if they are wary
They will not quote it at a sum immense.
The figure's immaterial-it may vary
From eighteen million down to eighteen pence.
I should put it rather low;
The good sense of doing so
Will be evident at once to any debtor.
When it's left to you to say
What amount you mean to pay,
Why, the lower you can put it at, the better.
THE PLAYS AND POEMS OF W.S. GILBERT 583, 620 (Random House publ. 1932).
13 See Dean, supra note 134, at 1342-43.
139 See text accompanying notes 75-77, supra.
140 See 1 A. DEWING, supra note 131, at 543-45.
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ing this notion. 141 Rather, the shareholders' equity would be-
come merely a residual figure to be plugged into the balance
sheet after the "meaningful" adjustments of other items. Re-
stated balance sheets would not separate retained earnings, capi-
tal stock and paid-in surplus accounts. Instead, an aggregate
figure for common shareholders' equity would be shown. 142 The
justification offered for this lumping is the impracticability of
determining when each item in the shareholders' equity accounts
arose.
143
As previously pointed out, the FASB would treat preferred
shares as a monetary item, the holding of which creates purchas-
ing power gains during inflationary periods. These gains are
credited to the common shareholders' equity.144 The full impli-
cations of this treatment of preferred have clearly not been con-
sidered.
First, the FASB fails to take account of the innumerable
variations of preferred shares that may be issued. 145 Although
preferred shares often have a preference both on dividends and
on liquidation, they need not be preferred as to both.' 46 Often,
two liquidation preference amounts are specified, one for volun-
tary and the other for involuntary liquidation. 14 7 Cumulative
preferred stock generally has a liquidation preference that in-
cludes accrued but unpaid dividends. 48 Preferred may often be
redeemable. The redemption price frequently is fixed at a pre-
mium above its par or stated value. 149 Shareholders thus are able
to protect their bargained-for dividend rate, making it expensive
to eliminate the preferred shares when cheaper funds are avail-
able.
The FASB draft states, however, that "[p]referred stock
shall not be restated to an amount in excess of its fixed liquida-
tion price,"' 50 without specifying whether it refers to price on
voluntary or involuntary liquidation. It also speaks of "preferred
stock that is carried in the balance sheet at an amount equal to its
141 FASB ExPosuRE DRAFT, supra note 2, 26.
1 2 Id. 46.
143 Id.
144 Id. 149.
'
4 5 See Buxbaum, Preferred Stock--Law and Draftsmanship, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 243
(1954).
146 Cf. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 15 (rev. ed. 1969).
147 See, e.g., V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELsTEiN, CORPORATE FINANCE 169-70 (1972).
1
48 Id.
149 See, e.g., E. DONALDSON & J. PFAHL, CORPORATE FINANCE 140 (3d ed. 1969).
150 FASB ExPosuRE DRAFr, supra note 2, 45.
19761
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:1013
fixed liquidation or redemption price,"'151 without realizing that
this liquidation price may be different from that payable upon
redemption. Moreover, cumulative preferred may not have a
"fixed" liquidation price, because unpaid accrued dividends gen-
erally change the amount payable on liquidation.
Under state dividend law, the restrictions that limit common
dividends also apply to preferred dividends.' 5 2 Retained earn-
ings, therefore, should in part be a measure of the amount of
dividends payable to preferred shareholders. Under the FASB
proposal, all earned surplus would become common sharehol-
ders' equity, 53 even though preferred holders in fact have an
interest in it in whole or in part. For example, although arrear-
ages may have accrued to increase the "fixed liquidation price"
of his shares, the preferred holder will see merely a single figure
for preferred stock, which he assumes amounts to the fixed dol-
lar amount of the original preference plus arrearages. To the
extent that the FASB intends that the preferred be carried at its
liquidation preference without added arrearages, the common
shareholders' equity includes those arrearages upon which pre-
ferred holders have first claim.
The apparent explanation for these inconsistencies is that
the drafters were thinking only of redeemable preferred issued
by a corporation as an alternative to debt. 54 In such case, the
crucial carrying figure for balance sheet purposes should be the
redemption price at the balance sheet date. It is this figure that,
in the going concern, is equivalent to the principal amount of a
debt obligation. And it is in terms of the preferred shareholder
qua creditor that the reporting in price-level adjusted statements
is directed.
In a sense, then, it is the shareholders' equity portion of the
balance sheet that is least informative. Yet disclosure under the
securities law generally directs itself to security holders, often
shareholders. This divergence indicates the problem. Price-
level accounting is not concerned primarily with reporting to
shareholders.
Our final inquiry, then, is to whom is such reporting di-
rected?
151 Id. 49.
152 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 45, 46 (rev. ed. 1969).
'5 FASB EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 2, 49.
'54Cf. 1 A. DEWING, supra note 131, at 130-31.
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IV. LEVERAGE FOR TAX REFORM
As we have observed, management is not eager to have
price-level adjusted statements for internal purposes. Investors
are likely to be confused by such statements. Why then propose
to make such statements mandatory? I would suggest that the
answer lies in Accounting Research Study No. 6, which explored at
great length the question of reporting effects of price level
changes:
Management is understandably reluctant to reduce
net income by charges that are not recognized by [sic]
tax purposes. But whether an item is, or is not, deducti-
ble for tax purposes is determined primarily by political
rather than by accounting considerations, and political
considerations should not determine accounting prac-
tice. Even so, the attitude of management reverses the
proper sequence. If the business community wants rec-
ognition of price-level changes for tax purposes, it
should take the lead by incorporating them in their fi-
nancial reports. Management and accountants are in a
weak position if they seem to favor a procedure for tax
purposes which they are unwilling to incorporate into
financial statements. 15&
The study then quotes a statement that Treasury Department
officials had made it clear that tax changes to recognize the
effects of inflation would only follow changes in accounting
practice.
156
SEC Chairman Hills has pointed out that his agency's pro-
posals would be a first step toward "tax reform." The replace-
ment cost footnotes would "better communicate business realities
to those who make tax policy and to those responsible for
macroeconomic policy."'
15 7
Motives are, of course, difficult to decipher; but few other
compelling reasons appear to require price-level accounting at
this time.158 The FASB in its exposure draft states that, "general
purchasing power accounting and current value accounting are
"I ARS No. 6, supra note 4, at 51.
156 Id. 51-52.
'17 Hills, supra note 22, at E-2.
1"8 Obtaining increased tax depreciation allowances has been reported to be top
legislative priority of "big business." Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
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proposals with different objectives . . .. [R]eporting current
values in financial statements will be considered in another proj-
ect presently on the Board's agenda . ... ,,59 Yet, what are the
different objectives of current value accounting? The preface to
the FASB's proposal indicates that the real difference is that pro-
cedures for applying general price-level adjustments are already
well-developed, while much research remains in the area of cur-
rent value accounting. 160 In other words, the importance is that
a half step toward current value accounting can be taken now
while the full step would be delayed some years.' 61
Financial statements prepared under generally accepted ac-
counting principles are intended to serve the common needs of
diverse users, including present and potential shareholders and
creditors. 62 To the extent these needs diverge, the emphasis has
been placed upon disclosure relevant to the current and pros-
pective investors and lenders.1 63 Yet accounting in units of gen-
eral purchasing power does little to assist shareholders or
creditors, present or potential. The FASB's concern with imme-
diate implementation of price-level accounting suggests a desire
to use financial reporting to achieve immediate tax relief
for business. Such politicization of financial reporting may in-
troduce distortions contrary to the standards of disclosure
under the federal securities laws.*
159 FASB EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 2, V 70.
160 Id. iii.
161 Taking the half step could very well preclude the whole. The high costs of
computer reprogramming, education and other expenses of adopting price-level ac-
counting would effectively prohibit for some time a second conversion to replacement
cost or current value accounting. See Burton, Financial Reporting in an Age of Inflation,
139 J. ACCOUNTANCY, Feb. 1975, at 68, 70.
162 See APB Statement No. 4, supra note 38, 125.
163 Id.
* At press time the SEC adopted the proposal described in note 22 supra but limited
it to businesses whose inventories plus gross property, plant, and equipment equal
S100,000,000 or more and ten percent or more of total assets. The SEC stated that it
does not view this as competitive with the FASB proposals. SEC Accounting Series Re-
lease No. 190, 5 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,212 (Mar. 23, 1976) (adding rule 3-17 to
regulation S-X); Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 7, 5 id. 74,166. At the same time, the
SEC proposed a safe harbor rule to deal with potential anti-fraud liability of persons
determining current replacement costs pursuant to the new requirements. SEC Secu-
rities Act Release No. 5696, [Current] id. 1 80,406 (Mar. 23, 1976).
